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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS-
COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
 
By 
 
Saidhonov Saidislombek 
 
 
 
There are a number of determinants of economic growth. However, the role of investment 
climate cannot be underestimated. The World Bank Group’s Doing Business Reports can be 
a good proxy to measure the business climate of each country. More and more countries 
have been using the Doing Business Index to conduct reforms for amendment of business 
environment within countries. The outcome of this paper assists in prioritizing the reforms 
and suggesting different views maximizing the efficiency of reforms. The empirical evidence 
of the paper suggests that the index has the impact in the case of developing countries and 
emphasizing on ‘Enforcing Contract’ and ‘Starting Business’ is more beneficial to improve 
the overall index. Thus, reformers should focus on the initial stages of the business cycle 
rather than on exit stages. 
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Introduction 
It is undoubtedly true to say that there are a number of determinants of economic 
growth. The question is why some countries develop faster while others even regress in 
their economic development is still under the hot debates. However, the significant impact 
of the private sector on economic performance is negligible. One of the important 
determinants of the degree of economic activity is laws and regulations, which in turn 
determine the level of success in the development of private sector. Flourishing private 
sector in a such and such economy with more and more new start-ups, with new 
employment opportunities as well as by developing new products and services may lead to 
the economic development of a country. The key player who determines the business-
friendly environment in an economy is a government. With a good government, which 
establishes the rules that reduce the cost of disputes, protects investors, and provides 
credits in an easier way with lower layers of bureaucracy and others. Overall, the 
opportunities given to entrepreneurs to run easily new Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) effect positively on an economy, as SMEs are the engines of economic growth. From 
country to country, we can observe different laws and regulations. It is widely believed that 
the catalyst of economic development for developing countries lies through the SMEs. In 
some countries, there are many obstacles to run a business due to the high costs of running 
start-ups, the level of bureaucracy, the lack of access to electricity and other problems 
associated with retarding economic growth.  
 According to the World Bank, SMEs provide 90% of job opportunities in low and 
middle-income countries1. More and more research outcomes conclude that in order to 
increase the productivity of private-sector-led economic growth, it should be emphasized 
                                                          
1 World Bank 2005; Stampini and others 2011. 
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not only on macroeconomic determinants but also on the laws, regulations, and 
institutional quality. A very good proxy to measure and take into account all 
aforementioned factors is the Ease of Doing Business index. This index may reflect the 
quality of institutions and friendliness of business environment in 189 countries. It captures 
10 sub-indicators regarding the different aspects of ease of doing business. Another 
beneficial fact of this index is that it accelerates and amends business environment in a 
country as the index promotes the competition atmosphere among economies because in 
the annual doing business report those countries which take leading position as well as the 
countries which significantly improved in that business index are mentioned and widely 
announced by the mass media. This phenomenon, in turn, has an encouraging impact for 
investors to make the injection of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in those distinctive 
economies. Thus, countries all over the world attempt to compete in order to attract 
international investments.  
 There are 10 different individual indicators which overall form one single aggregate 
ease of doing business index. It is hard to conduct reforms on each individual factor to boost 
up economic growth especially for developing countries. The main goal of this paper is to 
analyse the impact of individual factors on economic growth and prioritize not only its 
nominal effect but also the real effect considering the cost and benefit of the reforms.  
What is Ease of Doing Business?   
The Doing Business Report has been published annually since 2003 by the World 
Bank Group. The primary goal of the report is to evaluate in detail manner all the costs and 
obstacles to run a business all over the world and based on that evaluation of the World 
Bank Group, ranking for all countries all over the world are presented. The data collection 
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for Doing Business Index (DBI) is based on conducting a survey of 8000 experts in fields 
related to business (bankers, tax department workers, lawyers and the like) in 189 countries. 
The outcomes of the surveys are cross-checked as well as affirmed by a corresponding 
country before being published. Furthermore, the survey respondents are supposed to 
complete the survey in a written form as well as back up answers with corresponding laws, 
regulations, and costs by relying on common assumptions among all countries. 
Consequently, it helps to increase the reliability of the survey and the DBI.   
As can be seen from the Table 1, the index captures 10 individual indicators: starting 
a business, dealing with construction permits, employing workers, registering property, 
getting credit, protecting investors, taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, 
getting an electricity connection and closing a business. The first initiator who implemented 
the foundations of the index was Simeon Djankov. Djankov et al.  published the paper “The 
regulation of Entry” in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 2002. At that time, the index 
took into account only three indicators for only 85 countries. The paper concluded that 
countries with “red tape” entry barriers for new businesses tend to possess a higher level of 
corruption and larger proportion of shadow economy while more democratic countries with 
the fewer level of government intervention tend to have less barriers to entry.  
 In spite of the fact that the index takes into account a number of essential factors, 
which assist in describing business environment in a particular country but it should be 
borne in mind that there are also other regulatory determinants beyond the indicators 
presented in Table 1. The 2011 annual report on Doing Business2 says:  
                                                          
2 World Bank 2011:13 
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  “Doing Business functions as a kind of cholesterol test for the regulatory 
environment for domestic businesses. A cholesterol test does not tell us everything about the 
state of our health. But it does measure something important for our health. And it puts us 
on watch to change behaviours in ways that will improve not only our cholesterol rating but 
also our overall health.” 
Therefore, this index cannot represent the full picture of a legal system in a such and such 
country as it partially determines the regulatory system of a country. Also, reformers should 
keep in mind that emphasizing only on few individual sub-indicators voids the sample due to 
the fact that it becomes no longer random from the population which is the whole factors 
affecting the legal system. Hence, improving few indicators without treating the whole legal 
system as one, “enabling environment” can be marginally amended (Hanusch, 2012). To 
illustrate the point, the following example can be considered; in some countries, there are 
some limitations for foreigners including the ownership. It is similar to a deadlock where to 
own property a foreigner should have registration while to have registration he/she should 
have property. Even though that country may take leading position in the ease of doing 
business ranking but indeed it can be burdensome to run new businesses. Intellectual 
property regulations also can be viewed as a similar example.  
Overall, all limitations of the index can be summarized in the following way: the 
index does not consider corruption, poverty rate, unemployment rate and other 
macroeconomic determinants. In addition, it does not also capture financial system of a 
country and the sensitivity to the global financial crisis. Hence, DBI cannot be used as a full 
determinant of the regulatory system of a country, but it is only a proxy of a legal system.  
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 This study tries to fill a research gap by addressing business regulatory reforms’ 
impact on economic growth in the case of both developing as well as developed countries. 
The aim of including both groups of countries is to compare the effect of reforms. Moreover, 
this study also reveals the most influential variables on economic growth from all variables 
within doing business index by conducting cross-country analysis.  The paper primarily 
focuses on the one dependent variable: average GDP growth per capita, available from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Table 1 Ten sub-indicators of the Doing Business Index 
1.Starting a 
Business 
Procedures 
(number) 
Time (days) Cost (% of income 
per capita) 
Min. capital (% 
of income per 
capita) 
2.Dealing with 
Construction 
Permits 
Procedures 
(number) 
Time (days) Cost (% of income 
per capita) 
 
3.Getting 
Electricity 
Procedures 
(number) 
Time (days) Cost (% of income 
per capita) 
 
4.Registering 
Property 
Procedures 
(number) 
Time (days) Cost (% of property 
value) 
 
5.Getting Credit Legal Rights 
Index 
Depth of Credit 
Information 
Index 
Public registry 
coverage 
Credit bureau 
coverage 
6.Protecting 
Minority Investors 
Disclosure 
Index 
Director Liability 
Index 
Shareholder Suits 
Index 
 
7.Paying Taxes Payments 
(number) 
Time (hours) Total tax rate (% 
profit) 
 
8.Trading Across 
Borders 
Documents for 
export 
(number) 
Time for export 
(days) 
Cost to export 
(US$ /container) 
Documents for 
import (number) 
 Time for import 
(days) 
Cost to import 
(US$ / container) 
  
9.Enforcing 
Contracts 
Procedures 
(number) 
Time (days) Cost (% of debt)  
10.Resolving 
Insolvency 
Time (years) Cost (% of 
estate) 
Recovery rate 
(cents on $US) 
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Literature Review 
Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Djankov et al. (2002, 2003, 2004, 2006) 
argue that institutions are one of the most important determinants of economic progress 
and long-term economic growth of countries. In other words, those economies in the world 
which have had relatively better both political as well as economic institutions in the past 
are richer today in comparison to the nations which have had weaker institutions. The 
relationship between laws and regulations and other factors contributing to the 
performance of SMEs has been the target of many researches over the last two decades. 
Winston (1998) revealed that business regulations have the impact only on the large and 
sector-specified industries. However, relatively much fewer studies tried to analyse the 
impact of business regulatory reforms on the economic performance of a such and such 
country, partly due to the data limitation.  
The indirect effect of easing in doing business was revealed by a number of 
researchers (e.g. Klapper, Lewin and Quesada Delgado, 2009; Barseghyan, 2008). They 
concluded that reduction in the entry-to-business costs encourages new entrepreneurs, 
boosts up firms’ productivity as well as reduces the corruption related to bureaucracy. 
Moreover, similar conclusions were made by Freund and Bolaky (2008), Change, Kaltaniand 
Loayza (2009), Helpman, Melitzand Rubinstein (2008). Onefold process of running start-up 
businesses associated with a reduction in the unemployment rate. More transparent 
financial information sharing through financial institutions leads to higher overall 
commercial banks profitability and significantly reduces the default risk (Houston et al., 
2010). Bruhn (2008) studied the influence of regulations related to business registration on 
the economic activity of Mexico. By using panel data, the author found that the reform 
raised the number of registered businesses by 5% in eligible industries. Furthermore, 
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employment in corresponding eligible industries increased by 2.8%, and people who were 
previously unemployed or out of the labour force were more likely to be employed after the 
implementation of reform. Finally, the results imply that the competition from new entrants 
lowered the inflation rate by 0.6%.  
The literature after 1980 particularly focuses on the phenomenon of "endogenous 
growth", which states that economic growth is determined by socio - economic factors, the 
development of human capital, (Arrow, 1962; Sidrauski, 1967; Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; 
etc.). However, other theories and models developed by such famous economists as Harrod, 
Domar, Solow and others asserted that economic growth can be achieved by appropriate 
level of savings, capital accumulation, labour and technical progress (Rose, 1977), 
considering them as "external" (exogenous) factors, the endogenous growth theory tries to 
explain the increase in economic growth by relying on the endogenous factors of the model. 
Thus, Barro said that for a given level of real GDP growth per capita, positive economic 
growth can be achieved through raising the level of education, decreasing the government 
expenditure, reducing the price level; improvement in the enforcement of law, as well as 
improvement in terms of foreign trade (Barro, 1996). Also, Barro concluded that the level of 
democracy and political freedom has an insignificant impact on GDP growth. Indeed, for the 
initial low level of political rights, those positive advancements have a considerable 
influence on economic growth, after achieving some critical point of freedom and 
democracy, further expansion does not have any positive impact on GDP growth and even 
may have a negative effect, however. According to Barro, for a given level of all these 
variables, the economic growth pace is negatively associated with the initial level of 
economic growth per capita. In other words, the lower the GDP per capita at the initial point, 
the higher will be its increasing rate. 
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 Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu (2008) argue that in the long-run, institutions 
play a determining role in economic growth. According to their conclusion, countries which 
have good institutions have a higher economic growth which in turn makes them more 
developed. They focused their analysis on a certain type of institution which is the 
administrative rules of business operations. In this field, Djankov, McLiesh and Ramalho 
(2006) claim that administrative rules have in fact a considerable influence on economic 
performance in different countries. Djankov et al. (2006) and Haidar (2009) proved in their 
cross-country regressions that complicated and bureaucratized business regulatory 
procedures have the negative correlation with economic performance. 
A number of empirical studies have been conducted based on business regulation 
trends across countries over the last decade. Djankov et al. conducted several empirical 
researches focused on the relationship between laws and regulations on different aspects of 
an economy. For example, in 2002 they presented new data on the regulation of entry of 
start-up firms in 85 countries and concluded that those countries which have heavier 
regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger shadow economy, but not better 
quality of public or private goods. On the other hand, countries with more democratic and 
limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. Djankov et al. (2003) revealed that 
formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries, and is associated 
with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less honesty, less 
fairness in judicial decisions, and overall higher level of corruption. The conclusion according 
to these results can be made that legal transplantation tends to result in inefficiently high 
level of bureaucracy, particularly more in developing countries rather than in developed 
ones. Djankov et al. (2004) devoted their empirical analysis to learning the regulation of 
labour markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 
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countries. They argued that heavier regulation of labour is associated with lower labour 
force participation in the economy and higher rate of unemployment, especially among 
youngsters. 
 Moreover, Djankov et al. (2010) determined that the influence of time lags on export 
and import. They estimated a difference gravity equation that controls for distance and 
revealed that each additional day that a product is postponed to the process of being 
shipped shrinks the international trade by more than 1%. 
 From the beginning of the 2000s, empirical papers dedicated to the impact of 
regulations on economic performance have been increasing. From the perspective of 
business entry regulations, Desai et al. (2003) found cross-country correlations between 
laws and regulations and firm entry rates. They also revealed the influence of the 
institutional factors on the nature of entrepreneurial performance across European 
countries. A higher level of fairness, as well as protection of property rights, lead to raising 
the entry rates, shrinking exit rates, and lowering the average firm size. What is more, 
Klapper et al. (2004) by employing the database of firms located in Western and Eastern 
Europe analysed how the business environment in particular European country correlates 
with the creation of new firms. Hence, they claimed that entry regulations hinder entry level, 
especially in those field of industries where an entry level should be high. Also, value-added 
per employee in naturally ‘‘high entry’’ industries increase with lower pace in countries with 
burdensome regulations on entry. Viviano (2008) employing reforms to regional entry 
regulations in the retail trade sector of Italy, revealed that tough entry requirements have a 
negative impact on employment growth and on the productivity of small enterprises. From 
the perspective of labour regulations, such authors as Scarpetta et al. (2002) by employing 
micro-level primary data from OECD member countries tried to analyse the process of firms’ 
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entry and exit effect and found that relatively high and demanding product market and 
labour laws and regulations are negatively correlated with the entry of SMEs. Moreover, 
Hasan et al. (2007) had research by using Indian data and argued that labour demand 
elasticities in Indian manufacturing industries are larger in those states of India where the 
labour regulations are more compliant. On the contrary, Besley and Burgess (2004) asserted 
that Indian states where the labour regulations are very demanding and tough results in 
lower level of production, employment level, investment and overall productivity and it 
leads to increasing shadow economy. 
 The role of Small and Medium Enterprises in developing countries is immense. 
According to the World Bank (2005) and Stampini et al. (2011), the private sector ensures 
about 90% of jobs in developing countries. A number of empirical evidence argue that policy 
makers in order to develop the economy by having an impact on the private sector of the 
economy should also emphasize on the quality of laws, regulations and institutional 
arrangements rather than focusing only on macroeconomic determinants which are taken 
into account of doing business that shapes daily economic life3. 
Data and Methodology 
 
The analysis implements cross-section data for a more extended time period 2001-2015 
which is obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Generally, the 
methodology of this paper follows the methodology of Djankov et al. (2006), there are some 
discrepancies including in variable selection, however. The dependent variable of the 
analysis is GDP growth per capita while the independent variable of our interest is DBI. To 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Alesina and others (2005); Perotti and Volpin (2005); Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2010); 
Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007); Barseghyan (2008); Klapper, Lewin and Quesada Delgado (2009); Freund 
and Bolaky (2008); Chang, Kaltani and Loayza (2009); Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008); Klapper, Laeven 
and Rajan (2006); World Bank (2005); and Ardagna and Lusardi (2010) 
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see the strength of impact in different time periods, all regression analyses are divided into 
two-time period averages. In other words, GDP growth per capita is averaged over the 
previous 5 and 10 years (2006-2010 and 2001-2010) and DBI is averaged over the next 5 
years (2011-2015). The historical data for DBI is obtained from the Doing Business. Also, to 
prioritize the significance of sub-indicators, all 10 individual constituents were included as 
independent variables (Table 1). In order to conduct the analysis, the DBI and its 
constituents are normalized and used in the form of distance to frontier (DIF). According to 
Doing Business, DIF assists in evaluating the absolute level of legal performance and it gives 
the picture of all countries’ location relative to the “frontier”; the best country according to 
the relative indicator. What is more, it helps to observe the discontinuity between countries 
at any point in time as well as to see the absolute improvement over time. DIF can vary 
between 0 and 100 and the former value corresponds to the country which performs the 
worst while the latter value is the frontier or the best performer.  The main differences of 
this study in comparison to all other studies are that: 
 It captures more extended time period where the sub-indicator namely “Getting 
electricity” is included recently 
 The study compares the existence of discrepancies according to quantile by 
conducting quantile regression 
 It compares the cost and benefit of enhancing a particular significant indicator by 
finding the real cost 
 It conducts the robustness check for statistical significance of results 
 It clarifies the impact of DBI on GDP per capita growth over the different time 
periods. 
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By following the methodology of Djankov et al. (2006), the following empirical equations 
is obtained: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐵𝐼𝑖 +  Σ𝛽
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
Where 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖  is the dependent variable, 𝛽0 is intercept and the main 
independent variable of our interest is 𝛽1𝐷𝐵𝐼𝑖; Doing Business Index or its constituents. 
Σ𝛽′𝑋𝑖 captures all control variables and 𝑢𝑖  is error term.  
Basically, control variables follow the Djankov et al. (2006) and include the initial 
deviation from the GDP deflator as well as initial log GDP per capita which were obtained 
from the World Development Indicators. To take into account the effect of the financial 
crisis, additional independent variables are included: net export, government consumption 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) all of them are as a percentage of GDP. Civil conflict is 
also included as a control variable where it equals 1 if there was any civil conflict between 
2001-2010 and 2006-2010 and 0 otherwise. The data is taken from Gleditsch et al. (2002) 
version 4 of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, hosted within the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program. Another dummy variable is also included to capture whether the country belongs 
to low and middle-income country and geography: Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. 
Empirical results 
 
As a result of OLS regressions, the following table is obtained (Table 4). Table 4 
provides the outcomes for the OLS regressions where the average GDP per capita growth is 
taken as dependent variable while normalized DBI and a number of other control variables 
are also included as independent variables. The table presents the results for 5 and 10-year 
averages to compare and contrast the effect of independent variables on GDP growth per 
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capita. Due to the data availability, the sample size is restricted to 185 countries at its 
maximum when only DBI and initial log GDP per capita are included in the equation and the 
sample size is reduced to 173 countries when the other control variables are also included.  
Statistical tests  
 
 In order to have reliable results, different statistical tests were conducted. To avoid 
the potential threat of heteroscedasticity, all regressions’ standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and are based on robust standard errors. To begin with, to detect 
whether our regression models contain missing variables problem, Ramsey Regression 
Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) is conducted. So, by stating the zero hypothesis 
which says: “The model has no omitted variables” and the rejection of this hypothesis leads 
to the conclusion that a model may suffer from the endogeneity problem, more precisely, 
omitted variable bias. However, according to the outcome of the Ramsey RESET test, the 
zero hypothesis cannot be rejected at even 10% significance level due to the fact that p 
value is above 10%. In other words, the model does not suffer from omitted variable bias.  
 
According to the results of the regressions (Table 4), in all 8 equations, DBI has the 
positive impact on GDP growth per capita and the results are statistically significant at 1% 
and 5% significance levels. As regards to the initial log GDP per capita, it has statistically 
significant negative impact on the dependent variable which is also in tandem with the 
findings of Djankov et al. (2006) and Hanusch (2012). However, the initial deviation from 
GDP deflator, FDI as a percentage of GDP and civil conflict do not have statistically 
                  Prob > F =      0.1373
                 F(3, 163) =      1.87
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of gdp_pc_2001_2010
. estat ovtest
14 
 
significant impact on GDP growth per capita both for 5 and 10-year cases while the net 
export as a percentage of GDP is statistically significant only at 10% significance level.   
To check the existence of symptoms of imperfect multicollinearity the correlation 
matrix was created.  As a rule of thumb, if a correlation between two variables is above 0.8, 
imperfect multicollinearity can be claimed. 
 
Table 2 The correlation matrix 
Variables DBI Lngdp 
pcap. 
GDP 
defl. 
Civil 
confl. 
FDI Export Gov.cons Africa Lat_America East 
Asia 
DBI 1.00          
Lngdp per 
cap. 
0.74 1.00         
GDP defl. -0.16 -0.09 1.00        
Civil confl. -0.16 -0.27 0.08 1.00       
FDI 0.08 0.13 -0.02 -0.09 1.00      
Export 0.37 0.44 -0.07 -0.24 0.58 1.00     
Gov.cons 0.08 0.13 -0.07 -0.17 -0.01 -0.03 1.00    
Africa -0.54 -0.54 0.08 0.13 -0.03 -0.18 -0.08 1.00   
Lat_America -0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.12 -0.23 1.00  
East Asia 0.18 0.10 -0.03 -0.08 0.14 0.16 -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 1.00 
 
Table 3 Variance Inflation Factor 
Also, to be confident in the absence of imperfect 
multicollinearity, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is also 
calculated. If VIF is equal or greater than 5, it can be 
argued that imperfect multicollinearity in a model exists. 
However, according to the table 3, the highest VIF 
belongs to log of GDP per capita and accounts for only 2.49. So, there is no symptom of 
multicollinearity in this model. 
Table 4 The impact of DBI on GDP per capita growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Lngdp_pc 2.49 0.4008 
DBI 2.31 0.4333 
Export 1.95 0.5119 
FDI 1.56 0.6396 
Civil conflict 1.12 0.8926 
GDP defl 1.03 0.9687 
Mean VIF 1.75  
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Dependent 
Variable 
Average GDP per capita growth 
 5-year 10-year 5-year 10-year 5-year 10-year 5-year 10-year 
DB index 0.0829*
** 
0.0917*
** 
0.0808*
** 
0.0895*
* 
0.0782*
* 
0.0871*
* 
0.0790*
* 
0.0826*
* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
         
Initial log 
GDP per 
capita 
-
1.0876*
** 
 -
1.0836*
** 
 -
1.0303*
** 
 -
1.1410*
** 
 
 (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.18)  
         
Initial log 
GDP per 
capita 
 -
0.9737*
** 
 -
0.9539*
** 
 -
0.8997*
** 
 -
1.0681*
** 
  (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.18) 
         
Initial 
deviation 
from GDP 
deflator 
  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0003  
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
         
Initial 
deviation 
from GDP 
deflator 
   -0.0010  -0.0011  -0.0010 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
         
Civil 
conflict 
2006-2010 
    0.7538  0.8050  
     (0.49)  (0.48)  
         
Civil 
conflict 
2001-2010 
     0.6470  0.7670 
      (0.52)  (0.52) 
         
FDI (% of 
GDP) 
      0.0077 -0.0337 
       (0.02) (0.03) 
         
Export (% 
of GDP) 
      0.0094 0.0232* 
       (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Constant 6.2637*
** 
4.5337*
** 
6.3572*
** 
4.5027*
** 
5.9778*
** 
4.1206*
** 
6.3833*
** 
4.8498*
** 
16 
 
 (1.04) (0.99) (1.04) (1.01) (1.09) (1.04) (1.12) (1.10) 
Observatio
ns 
185 184 185 183 185 183 175 173 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.167 0.151 0.163 0.148 0.167 0.151 0.173 0.184 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The next table (Table 5) provides the results by adding additional control variables. 
Equation 9 and 10 contain additional control variable which reflects government 
consumption as a % of GDP. Even though all other coefficients stay similar to Table 4 but the 
effect of government consumption as a % of GDP is statistically insignificant. In all regression 
results, the impact of the civil conflict is statistically insignificant on per capita economic 
growth. In addition, equations 11 and 12 contain geographical dummy variables for Africa, 
East Asia, and Latin America.  Consequently, adding those dummy variables reduces the 
significance level as well as the coefficient of DBI. It is clear from the Table 5 that African 
countries have the negative values which account for -1.26 and -1.86 in equations 11 and 12, 
respectively. As regards to the other two dummy variables, they are statistically insignificant 
even at 10% significance level. The next equations (13, 14, and 15 in Table 5) control for the 
economic status of countries according to the World Bank classification.  The findings of the 
3 equations (Equation 13, 14 and 15) in Table 5 are very surprising. According to the results 
of regression analysis, the business friendly atmosphere is associated with economic growth 
only in developing countries while the impact of DBI is statistically insignificant in developed 
countries even at 10% significance level in the 10-year period. Overall, it can be concluded 
that business friendly environment may lead to economic growth in the developing 
countries rather than in developed ones.    
Table 5 The impact of DBI on GDP per capita growth 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)  
 5-year 10-year 5-year 10-year 5-year 10-year 10-year  
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low & 
middle 
income 
low & 
middle 
income 
high 
income 
DB index 0.0763*
* 
0.0813*
* 
0.0561* 0.0534 0.0765
** 
0.1081*
** 
0.0444  
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)  
         
Initial log GDP 
per capita 2006 
-
1.1077*
** 
 -
1.2149*
** 
 -
0.4479 
   
 (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.24)    
         
Initial deviation 
from GDP 
deflator 2006 
-0.0003  -0.0004  -
0.0004 
   
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)    
         
Civil conflict 
2006-2010 
0.6385  0.5755  1.0055    
 (0.49)  (0.48)  (0.53)    
         
FDI net inflows 
(%ofGDP) 
0.0069 -0.0336 0.0018 -0.0371 0.0053 -0.0478 0.0076  
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)  
         
Export 2009-2015 0.0074 0.0221* 0.0093 0.0234* 0.0230 0.0280* 0.0101  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)  
         
Aver.gov.cons.20
06-2010 
0.0103  0.0141  0.0188    
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)    
         
Initial log GDP 
per capita 2001 
 -
1.0494*
** 
 -
1.1926*
** 
 -
0.7157*
* 
-
2.6015**
* 
 
  (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.23) (0.43)  
         
Initial deviation 
from GDP 
deflator 2001 
 -0.0011  -0.0011  -0.0009 -0.0009  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  
         
Civil conflict 
2001-2010 
 0.6532  0.6871  1.1121 0.5371  
  (0.54)  (0.52)  (0.61) (0.62)  
         
Aver.gov.cons.20
01-2010 
 -0.0095  -0.0102  0.0038 -0.0823  
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.12)  
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Dummy for 
Africa 
  -
1.2588* 
-
1.8574*
** 
    
   (0.53) (0.52)     
         
Dummy for Latin 
America 
  0.5031 -0.3600     
   (0.56) (0.41)     
         
Dummy for East 
Asia 
  2.1078 1.5519     
   (1.43) (1.20)     
         
Constant 6.2507*
** 
5.0393*
** 
8.4825*
** 
8.3315*
** 
0.8454 0.7921 24.1827*
** 
 
 (1.13) (1.19) (1.40) (1.17) (1.71) (1.63) (5.13)  
Observations 170 169 170 169 116 115 54  
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.171 0.199 0.234 0.059 0.166 0.514  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
As it was mentioned above, the doing business index contains ten sub-indicators. Especially 
for developing countries, it is hard and even sometimes it is impossible to amend some of 
these sub-indicators. Hence, to be able to prioritize the most influential constituents of the 
DBI and to answer the question which says: “Which of reforms out of the 10 constituents 
should be prioritized by governments if they want to increase the impact of conducting 
reforms on GDP growth per capita?” Also, this analysis reveals whether the newly 
implemented constituent namely “Getting electricity” has statistically significant impact on 
economic performance. The equation 6 from the table 4 is chosen by implementing ten 
individual indicators to analyze the 10-year average effect of those indicators. The results of 
the regression analysis are presented in Figure 1 in a simplified version. Rhombuses are the 
amount of corresponding variable’s coefficient on the horizontal axe. The different coloured 
lines represent three confidence intervals. The shortest line represents 90%, the longer one 
represents 95% and the longest line reflects 99% confidence intervals. As can be seen from 
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the Figure 1, the bottom of the figure contains the list of ten constituents of the DBI and 
some of them contain stars which represent statistical significance. One star means that 
particular variable is statistically significant at 10% significance level while the variables 
containing two stars mean that they are significant at 5% significance level and three stars 
mean the significance of the indicators at 1% significance level. The most important 
indicators of DBI are ‘Enforcing Contracts’ which is statistically significant at even 1% 
significance level and similar to the findings of Scully (1988) and Barro (1991) and Dollar et 
al. (2005) as well as ‘Starting Business’ which is statistically significant at 5% significance 
level. However, according to the findings of Hanusch (2012) the most influential indicators 
were found as ‘Getting Credit’. So, improving the conditions: reducing the time and costs 
associated with solving disputes in a local court may be positively reflected in the economic 
performance of a country. On the other hand, ‘Starting Business’ indicator should be 
emphasized to achieve better GDP growth per capita and new businesses should be 
motivated to run. The next indicators according to the impact on economic performance are 
‘Getting Credit’ which coincides with the findings of Ross (1997, 1999) and Aterido and 
Hallward-Driemeier (2007) and ‘Protecting Minority Shareholders’ and both of them are 
statistically significant at 1% significance level. Finally, ‘Getting Electricity’ and ‘Registering 
Property’ are also significant but less important in magnitude in comparison to the other 
aforementioned indicators. The former one is almost statistically significant at 95% 
confidence interval while the latter one is statistically significant at 1% significance level.       
 However, ‘Dealing with Construction Permits’, ‘Paying Taxes’, ‘Resolving Insolvency’ 
and ‘Trading Across Borders’ are statistically insignificant. To achieve better economic 
performance according to the business cycle it is clearly proved that focusing on the initial 
stage is more important rather than ending stage.  However, it cannot be claimed that these 
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indicators do not have any impact on economic performance even though they do not have 
statistically significant impact on GDP growth per capita. One of the most important reason 
is that the measurement of these indicators may also have an impact whether they are 
statistically significant or not. According to economic theory, we know the importance of 
fiscal policy’s tax regime and the high cost of running a business are negatively associated 
with economic performance as less new start-ups are ready to be run. Also, ‘Trading across 
borders’, in other words, the costs associated with three procedures which are the level of 
bureaucracy related to a documentary, border compliance and domestic transport 
regarding the whole process of international trade and a shipment of goods and services. 
Figure 1 Individual Doing Business Effects on average GDP growth per capita 
 
To see not only the average relationship between the DBI and per capita economic 
growth by implementing OLS technique but we are also interested in revealing the impact of 
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the DBI at different points in the conditional distribution of our dependent variable. Thus, to 
identify the process of entire distribution, the quantile regression is also conducted. 
Moreover, another advantage of conducting quantile regression is that it gives a full 
statistical analysis of the stochastic link between a dependent variable and its covariates. It 
also assists to cope with heteroscedasticity and quantile regression’s outcomes are more 
robust against outliers in the reaction measurement.  It can be clearly observed from the 
Table 6, Figure 2 and Figure 3 that the bottom 5% countries have negative GDP growth per 
capita while the top 5% quantile of the countries have ranged between 6% and 13.63% GDP 
growth rate per capita. The median GDP growth per capita accounts for about 2%.  
Figure 2 Average GDP growth per capita over 5 years by quantiles 
 
Figure 3 Average GDP growth per capita over 10 years by quantiles 
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Table 6 GDP per capita growth rate at different quantiles 
GDP per capita 2001-2010 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% -5.4176 -5.9254   
5% -0.7893 -5.4176   
10% 0.2630 -1.8320 Obs. 187 
25% 0.8566 -1.4207 Sum of Wgt. 187 
50% 2.3806 Mean 2.6598 
  Largest Std. Dev. 2.6598 
75% 3.9731 9.8851   
90% 5.7615 11.6115 Variance 7.0748 
95% 6.3757 13.6294 Skewness 0.9090 
99% 13.6294 13.9461 Kurtosis 6.3317 
GDP per capita 2006-2010 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% -4.6037 -9.4528   
5% -1.1378 -4.6037   
10% -0.4811 -3.3754 Obs. 186 
25% 0.4769 -2.9346 Sum of Wgt. 186 
50% 2.2735 Mean 2.3643 
  Largest Std. Dev. 2.7835 
75% 4.0611 7.9621   
90% 5.6638 8.8396 Variance 7.7477 
95% 6.6803 10.7029 Skewness 0.2984 
99% 10.7029 15.1834 Kurtosis 6.2178 
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The quantile regression is conducted to observe the impact of DBI at different quantiles as 
well as compare with the OLS results. (Table 8)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 OLS and Impacts at Different Quantiles 
 (1) (2) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable  Average GDP per capita growth 
 OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
DBI 0.083** 0.109*** 0.105*** 0.092** 0.038 0.039 
 (2.75) (3.80) (5.86) (3.33) (1.75) (0.77) 
       
Initial log GDP per capita 
2001 
-
1.068*** 
-0.683** -
0.895*** 
-
1.150*** 
-1.262*** -1.503*** 
 (-6.05) (-2.91) (-6.13) (-5.09) (-7.14) (-3.63) 
       
Initial deviation from GDP 
deflator 2001 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.11) (-0.44) (-1.38) (0.33) (-0.97) (-0.58) 
       
Civil conflict 2001-2010 0.767 0.324 0.802 0.109 0.152 -0.295 
 (1.48) (0.49) (1.96) (0.17) (0.31) (-0.25) 
       
FDI net inflows (%ofGDP) -0.034 -0.008 0.009 0.003 -0.048 -0.052 
 (-1.23) (-0.23) (0.42) (0.09) (-1.80) (-0.84) 
       
Export 0.023* 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.027** 0.027 
 (2.14) (1.06) (1.40) (0.79) (3.22) (1.37) 
       
_cons 4.850*** -1.742 1.072 5.272*** 10.424*** 13.254*** 
 (4.42) (-1.30) (1.28) (4.08) (10.31) (5.60) 
N 173 173 173 173 173 173 
t statistics in parentheses 
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* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 7 demonstrates that the impact of the DBI on GDP growth per capita is larger at lower 
quantiles (q 0.1, q 0.25 and q 0.50) and statistically significant. The impact of the DBI at that 
quantiles are similar to the effect of OLS. However, the DBI impact on the dependent 
variable is weaker at the higher quantiles (q 0.75 and q 090) and statistically insignificant.  
 The results of Table 7 are graphed in Figure 4 in order to illustrate the effect on 
distribution. The graph clearly demonstrates whether the independent variables are 
significantly different from OLS results. The first line graph in Figure 4 is the figure of our 
interest where it can be seen that approximately at 0.1 quantile the impact of DBI is 
significantly different from the OLS coefficient and the countries in the lowest 0.1 quantile 
have more benefit from the DBI rather than average results of OLS. However, other 
quantiles’ coefficients are not significantly different from the OLS results.  
Figure 4 The average 10-year effect on quantile distribution 
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 To be confident in the interquartile differences, the formal test of the equivalence of 
the estimates in particular quartile is conducted. The following cross-equation hypothesis is 
set and tested. (Table 8) 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 Interquartile Difference Tests 
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According to the Table 8, it is obvious that there are statistically significant interquartile 
differences between q25 and q90 and the zero hypothesis which states there is no 
difference is rejected at 5% significance level. Moreover, there are also interquartile 
differences between q10 and q75 as well as q10 and q90 but they are significant at 10% 
significance level. So, it can be concluded that the effect of the DBI is different throughout 
different economies and quantile regression may produce more precise and detailed results 
to each group of the economy.  
Recommendations 
 
It is true to say that within given time and with given resources each country tries to 
maximize the impact of conducting reforms. The analyses conducted in this paper have 
determined the most influential indicators on economic performance. However, this paper 
proposes to think reformers not only on the importance of a particular indicator on 
economic growth but also with minimal resources and time spent on a realization of 
reforms to achieve optimal economic performance. For instance, in this analysis even 
though ‘Enforcing Contracts’ is the most promoter of economic growth among the ten 
constituents of DBI, in order to amend this indicator, reformers should try to decrease the 
            Prob > F =    0.0727
       F(  1,   166) =    3.26
 ( 1)  [q10]DBI - [q75]DBI = 0
. test [q10=q75]: DBI
            Prob > F =    0.7005
       F(  1,   166) =    0.15
 ( 1)  [q10]DBI - [q50]DBI = 0
. test [q10=q50]: DBI
            Prob > F =    0.0488
       F(  1,   166) =    3.94
 ( 1)  [q25]DBI - [q90]DBI = 0
. test [q25=q90]: DBI
            Prob > F =    0.0925
       F(  1,   166) =    2.86
 ( 1)  [q10]DBI - [q90]DBI = 0
. test [q10=q90]: DBI
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cost, as well as time spent on legal issues, occurred in court and overall ability of a legal 
system should be amended. Hence, to conduct this reform, many changes of a legal system 
in a particular country should be done. As a result, additional human capital and premises 
devoted to coping with such issues should be built and improved which requires a huge 
amount of financing which in turn increases the cost of such reforms considerably. As it was 
claimed above, the DBI’s effect mostly associated with better economic performance in 
developing countries while those countries have a limited budget to cope with such issues 
and conduct these reforms. What this paper suggests is that each indicator’s coefficient 
should be treated as a future value with different interest rates and present value by 
discounting to the cost should be found to achieve the most efficient outcome with minimal 
cost. To address this issue and implement in practice we can improve another indicator 
namely ‘Starting Business’ and the impact of it insignificantly lower than the former one but 
the cost of conducting this reform is considerably lower than ‘Enforcing Contracts’. By 
reducing the level of bureaucracy or cutting the so-called ‘red tape’ which makes the 
process of running start-up more complicated, the amendment in overall DBI and its effect 
on economic performance can be achieved.     
 On the other hand, even though governments may wish to improve the Doing 
Business environment within a country but at the same time, they would not want to lose 
its power. In my view, ‘Paying Taxes’ and ‘Dealing with Construction Permits’ have a high 
correlation for a government. Collecting money through taxes as well as multistage licencing 
and bureaucratic stages are the main sources of money and the leverage of many 
governments. Amending these indicators automatically means a poorer government which 
in turn leads to a reduction of the scale of government and power. If aforementioned is true, 
governments may want to leave both indicators in the status quo.  
28 
 
 What is more, some DBI indicators can be improved by the government of a 
particular country such as ‘Paying Taxes’ or ‘Starting Business’ while other indicators like 
‘Trading Across Borders’ is beyond the control of a single government and without 
consensus of several countries may be impossible to amend. For example, some 
neighbouring countries have a hostile relationship due to political issues such as India and 
Pakistan or Palestine and Israel and others where the “discount rate” is huge and for these 
countries making any improvement in that indicator is mission impossible task as they may 
not want to cooperate. Therefore, before conducting any reform, governments should be 
aware of potential obstacles and cost to address a particular issue related to increasing the 
DBI.        
On the other hand, especially for developing countries, the DBI is a chance to 
improve international image as a country with a business friendly environment, as the 
countries which are improved significantly in the DBI attract foreign direct investments as 
they are widely published by mass media. So, this phenomenon will have a spillover effect 
for that developing economies to develop faster and motivate them even more to create 
business-friendly environment.  
The DBI is also can be viewed as evaluation scale of each ministry’s performance. As 
DBI is relatively fair criteria of the legal environment of each corresponding sector. So, 
governments may set control and measure the performance of each ministry to which 
different indicators are attached. For example, the performance of Ministry of Energy can 
be measured whether new businesses may easily pass all procedures with a short period of 
time and minimum cost to obtain a permanent electricity connection or not. Any change, 
both positive or negative regarding this issue will be reflected in the ‘Getting Electricity’ 
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indicator. If governments want to amend the DBI efficiently they should focus on those 
reforms which may yield them the largest benefit on the aggregate DBI. While treating the 
DBI rating according to its constituents, we should be aware of heterogeneity in weights. In 
other words, some countries emphasize more on some indicators while they do not care 
much about others. ‘Getting Credit’ and ‘Protecting Minority Investors’ illustrate the point. 
‘Getting Credit’ may be different from a country to a country. For example, in the Arabic 
countries, the financial system is operated under Islamic Banking system while in some 
African countries banking system may be underdeveloped due to the existence of shadow 
economy. As regards to ‘Protecting Minority Investors’, countries which do not have a need 
for stock exchange market will not try to develop this indicator but it does not mean that 
overall business environment is poor. So, it should be borne in mind some country-specific 
traits which may require weighted DBI.  
Conclusion  
 
This paper tried to illuminate different vision to promote economic growth rather 
than traditional classic determinants to improve economic performance. Although, there 
are some limitations of the DBI, still, it is a good proxy to measure the business environment 
in countries all over the world and to conduct reforms. Based on the DBI, this analysis 
illuminates the most influential indicators leading to economic growth. ‘Enforcing contracts’ 
and ‘Starting Business’ have the highest impact on economic performance. The next 
indicators influencing on GDP growth per capita according to the coefficients are as follows: 
‘Protecting Minority Investors’, ‘Getting Credit’, ‘Registering Property’, and ‘Getting 
Electricity’. However, before conducting any reform to amend the DBI, reformers should 
bear in mind that the present value of these reforms should be analysed by discounting to 
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the cost of the reforms rather than focusing only on the large significant coefficients. Also, 
as it was mentioned above, political cost should also be considered and if the advantages of 
conducting reforms outnumber the costs and long-run side effects only then reforms should 
be conducted. Nevertheless, as the analysis was conducted based on aggregate cross-
section data, the results cannot ideally fit the individual country. Hence, the absence of the 
stock market in some countries may mean that country may not be interested in amending 
‘Protecting Minority Investors’ indicator. Recently added new variable, ‘Getting Electricity’ is 
tested and can be claimed that it has statistically significant impact on improving economic 
performance.  
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    Mean VIF        1.75
                                    
gdpdefl~2001        1.03    0.968712
civil~1_2010        1.12    0.892635
_2015fdi_n~p        1.56    0.639564
export_~2015        1.95    0.511928
         DBI        2.31    0.433306
lngdp_p~2001        2.49    0.400843
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. estat vif
                                                                                              
                       _cons     4.849802   1.097095     4.42   0.000     2.683745     7.01586
            export_2009_2015     .0231811   .0108141     2.14   0.034     .0018301    .0445321
_2015fdi_net_inflows__of_gdp    -.0337013   .0273423    -1.23   0.219    -.0876848    .0202821
        civil_confl2001_2010     .7669728   .5192487     1.48   0.142    -.2582099    1.792156
            gdpdefl_dev_2001    -.0010262   .0009222    -1.11   0.267     -.002847    .0007947
               lngdp_pc_2001    -1.068069   .1766316    -6.05   0.000    -1.416803   -.7193345
                         DBI     .0826178   .0300057     2.75   0.007     .0233759    .1418597
                                                                                              
            gdp_pc_2001_2010        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                             Robust
                                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.3862
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2128
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,   166) =   10.37
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     173
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   east_asia     0.1838   0.1032  -0.0303  -0.0795   0.1358   0.1617  -0.0458  -0.1100  -0.0640   1.0000
 lat_america    -0.0486   0.0349   0.0070  -0.0696  -0.0690  -0.1023  -0.1188  -0.2308   1.0000
      africa    -0.5424  -0.5425   0.0755   0.1310  -0.0253  -0.1847  -0.0771   1.0000
 gov_cons_10     0.0780   0.1311  -0.0698  -0.1659  -0.0031  -0.0291   1.0000
export_~2015     0.3747   0.4354  -0.0728  -0.2353   0.5779   1.0000
_2015fdi_n~p     0.0792   0.1342  -0.0204  -0.0885   1.0000
civil~1_2010    -0.1574  -0.2678   0.0848   1.0000
gdpdefl~2001    -0.1596  -0.0905   1.0000
lngdp_p~2001   0.7435  1.0000
         DBI     1.0000
                                                                                                        
                    DBI lng~2001 gdp~2001 c~1_2010 _2015f~p exp~2015 gov_c~10   africa lat_am~a east_a~a
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 99%     10.70285       15.18339       Kurtosis       6.217796
95%     6.680337       10.70285       Skewness       .2984455
90%     5.663799       8.839563       Variance       7.747708
75%      4.06108        7.96207
                        Largest       Std. Dev.       2.78347
50%      2.27353                      Mean           2.364264
25%     .4768586      -2.934639       Sum of Wgt.         186
10%    -.4811398      -3.375442       Obs                 186
 5%    -1.137766      -4.603665
 1%    -4.603665      -9.452758
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                      GDP_pc_2006_2010
99%     13.62943       13.94612       Kurtosis       6.331685
95%     6.375712       13.62943       Skewness       .9090447
90%     5.761483       11.61146       Variance       7.074797
75%     3.973101       9.885134
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      2.659849
50%     2.380589                      Mean           2.659787
25%     .8565872      -1.420672       Sum of Wgt.         187
10%     .2629592      -1.831999       Obs                 187
 5%    -.7892535      -5.417593
 1%    -5.417593      -5.925382
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                      GDP_pc_2001_2010
